While many algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) schemes have been proposed to detect so errors o ine in the fast Fourier transform (FFT) a er computation nishes, none of the existing ABFT schemes detect so errors online before the computation nishes.
INTRODUCTION
As the size of transistors continues to reduce and the number of components continues to increase, so errors in supercomputers become more and more common [18] . In fault tolerance literature, many techniques have been proposed to detect and/or correct so errors. e best-known general technique to detect so errors is the double modular redundancy (DMR) approach. is approach either uses two di erent hardware units to perform the same computation at the same time or performs the same computation on the same hardware twice, then compares the two results to detect whether errors occur or not.
e most well-known general technique to correct single so errors is the triple modular redundancy (TMR) approach. TMR either performs the same computation on three di erent hardware units or uses the same hardware to perform the same computation for three times, then compares and votes the majority results as the correct result. While DMR and TMR are very general, their overhead is high -at least 100% overhead to detect errors and 200% overhead to correct errors.
To protect memory corruption, ECC (Error Correcting Codes) memory has been widely used by many computer vendors. Although today's ECC memory can detect and correct bit ips in memory, it brings signi cant overhead in space, time, and energy. Furthermore, ECC memory is not able to handle computational (i.e. arithmetic) errors that are caused by faults in logic units.
In order to signi cantly reduce fault tolerance overhead, algorithmic characteristics have been leveraged to design highly e cient fault tolerance schemes since 1984 [20] . Over the past thirty years, many algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) schemes have been proposed in literature. In [20] , Huang and Abraham proposed the rst ABFT scheme to detect miscalculations in matrix operations on systolic arrays. In [3] , Banerjee et al. proposed an ABFT scheme that works for hypercube multiprocessor. In [29, 30] , Shantharam et al. analyzed the impact of so errors on iterative linear algebra methods and proposed a fault tolerant scheme for preconditioned Conjugate Gradient methods for sparse linear systems. In [31] , Sloan et al. propsoed an algorithmic approach to detect errors in sparse linear algebra. In [28] , Sao and Vuduc explored a selfstabilizing fault tolerance approach for iterative methods. In [14] , Ellio et al. analyzed the impact of so errors on GMRES algorithm. In [24] , Li et al. designed an ABFT scheme with a cooperative so ware-hardware approach. In [37, 39] , Wu et al. proposed an ABFT scheme to correct errors in matrix operation online. In [12] , Davies proposed an online scheme to correct so errors in LU factorization. In [13] , Di and Cappello carefully characterized 18 realworld HPC applications and proposed an adaptive impact-driven approach to detect errors in these applications. In [9] , Chien et al. proposed a new programming approach GVR that allows applications to describe error detection (checking) and recovery routines and inject them into the GVR stack for e cient implementation. In [4] , Bridges et al. proposed a fault-tolerant linear solvers via selective reliability. In [32] , Stoyanov and Webster showed some numerical analysis of xed point algorithms for silent hardware faults. Besides those, some more work is carried out on linear algebra methods [5, 7, 8, 38, 40] , iterative solvers [21, 34] , and error propagations [2, 6] .
For fast Fourier transform (FFT), Antola et al. proposed a timeredundant scheme in [1] . In [10] , Choi and Malek introduced a fault tolerance scheme for FFT that is based on recomputing through an alternate path. In [22] , Jou and Abraham proposed an ABFT scheme for the FFT networks that can achieve 100% fault coverage and throughput at a cost of O ( 2 log 2 N ) hardware overhead. Later, in [33] , Tao and Hartmann came up with a novel encoding scheme for FFT networks which has higher fault coverage by adding 5% hardware. A er that, in [35] , Wang and Jha presented a new concurrent error detection (CED) scheme that achieves be er result with less hardware redundancy. en, in [26] , Oh showed a similar CED scheme using a di erent checksum with increased fault coverage. Additionally, some progress has also been made on parallel system and GPUs. Banerjee [3] proposed a fault tolerant design on hypercube multiprocessors. Pilla [27] presented speci c so ware-based hardening strategies to reduce the failure rate. Fu and Yang [17] also implemented a fault tolerant parallel FFT using MPI.
While many o ine ABFT schemes have been proposed for FFT over the past thirty years, a careful review of the existing ABFT literature indicates that no previous ABFT schemes can detect and correct so errors online before an FFT computation nishes. is paper proposes an online ABFT scheme for FFT so that errors in an FFT computation can be e ciently corrected in the middle of the computing in a timely manner before the computation nishes. Because the FFT of a large vector is o en computed via computing the FFTs of many smaller sub-vectors, a natural idea to correct errors online is to use the existing o ine ABFT approaches to each small FFT computations. However, in this paper, we nd that simply applying o ine ABFT to each decomposed small FFTs introduces too much overhead due to the following facts. Firstly, the input of the decomposed FFTs is non-contiguous. Multiple non-contiguous reads or writes cause much longer memory access time because of heavy cache misses. Secondly, separated function calls to the fault tolerant version small FFTs would not reuse the computed input checksum vector, making the online version at least twice slower than the o ine version. irdly, there will be at least three memory checksum generations and veri cations since each divided FFT needs to be protected and there is a rearrangement of data a er the rst part, leading to large overhead when memory errors are taken into consideration.
FFT is widely used to compute the discrete Fourier transform (DFT). DFT plays a very important role in engineering, science, and mathematics. erefore, reliable and fast computing of DFT will bene t not only a large number of people but also a wide range of elds. e main contributions of this paper include:
• e rst online ABFT scheme for FFT: Existing ABFT schemes for FFT [1, 10, 22, 25, 26, 33, 35] detect so errors o ine a er the FFT computation nishes. Even if an error occurs at the beginning of the FFT, existing ABFT schemes can not detect it in a timely manner, hence, have to allow the corrupted computation to continue until it nishes, then verify the correctness. A er an error is detected, the whole FFT computation has to be restarted. is paper designs an online ABFT scheme that is able to detect errors online soon a er the error occurs so that the corrupted computation can be terminated in a timely manner. A er the corrupted computation is terminated, instead of repeating the whole computation from the beginning, the proposed online ABFT scheme only need to repeat a small fraction the computation. erefore the computation e ciency will be greatly improved when errors occur.
• e rst so -error-resilient FFT so ware implementation -FT-FFTW: Existing FFT ABFT schemes are either designed for hard errors or designed under the context of hardware implementation. is paper develops so -error-resilient FFT so ware for the rst time. We develop FT-FFTW, incorporate both the existing o ine ABFT and the newly proposed online ABFT into one of the today's fastest FFT so ware libraries -FFTW, and validate the implementations on TIANHE-2 supercomputer. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed online ABFT is able to detect so errors in a timely manner before the computation nishes and improve the computation e ciency by a factor of two when errors occur.
• Innovative optimizations for online ABFT FFT: It is very challenging to add fault tolerance capability to the highly optimized FFTW library without introducing signi cant performance penalty. Simply applying existing ABFT to each small FFTs within a large FFT introduces too much overhead. is paper develops several optimization strategies to reduce the overhead. e optimized online ABFT FFT introduces lower overhead than the existing o ine scheme even if no error occurs.
• e rst online ABFT scheme for parallel in-place FFT: Di erent from the out-of-place sequential FFT, the parallel FFT tends to use in-place FFT with no auxiliary space. We develop an online ABFT scheme for in-place FFT and extend our FFT ABFT scheme from sequential to parallel.
• Parallel optimization strategy to minimize the overhead:
We develop a communication-computation overlap strategy to hide half of the fault tolerance cost for our parallel FT-FFTW.
With the re-designed plan, the parallel FT-FFTW is able to achieve comparable performance to the original FFTW library.
• Signi cant improvement in numerical stability and fault coverage: Round-o errors for oating point calculations a ect the numerical stability and fault coverage. is paper analyzes the impact of round-o errors for our online ABFT scheme in detail and shows that our online ABFT scheme has higher numerical stability and be er fault coverage than the existing schemes. When developing fault tolerance schemes, there is a tradeo between generality and e ciency. In order to leverage the algorithmic characteristics to optimize e ciency, this paper trades generality for be er e ciency. While automating the proposed ABFT scheme to gain generality will loss the e ciency obtained, part of the idea in this paper can still be generalized to other divideand-conquer applications if an o ine fault tolerance scheme can be designed for each individual sub-problem.
BACKGROUND 2.1 DFT and FFT
e DFT for a complex sequence can be calculated as follows:
where ω N = exp −i 2π N and i = √ −1 is the unit imaginary root. Correspondingly, the inverse discrete Fourier transform (IDFT) can be calculated as:
If DFT or IDFT is calculated directly, it is obvious that O (N 2 ) operations are needed as each element costs O (N ) operations. To save more time, the fast Fourier transform (FFT) has been proposed to reduce the number of operations to O (N log N ). e most popular Cooley-Tukey algorithm for FFT can be derived as follows. If the size N can be factorized into two smaller integers as N = N 1 N 2 , (1) can be rewri en by le ing j = j 1 N 2 + j 2 and n = n 2 N 1 + n 1 :
is an N 2 -point DFT and
is an N 1 -point DFT. us the original N -point DFT is decomposed to N 1 inner DFTs of size N 2 and N 2 outer DFTs of size N 1 . ese N 1 -point DFTs and N 2 -point DFTs can also be decomposed into DFTs of smaller sizes recursively. By this means, the total operations of DFT is reduced to O (N log N ).
Previous Fault Tolerant Work for FFT
Many ABFT schemes have been designed to detect and correct so errors in FFT. ese schemes typically use concurrent error detection scheme with encoding and decoding system. To illustrate how these ABFT schemes work, we take Wang's approach in [35] Set the calculation ag calcFla = true 3:
Calculate input checksum vector c = rA
while calcFla do
5:
Calculate the FFT: X = Ax 6:
end while 8: end procedure as an example. As a special case of matrix-vector multiplication, a DFT can be wri en into matrix form according to equation (1):
. . .
Let A denote the coe cient matrix where A i j = ω i j N , X denotes the output vector, x denotes the input vector, the matrix form can be simply wri en as X = Ax. e equation maintains by multiplying X and Ax with a selected checksum vector r : X rX = Ax rAx r is called the weighted checksum for this matrix operation. e last row of the matrix can be expanded as:
en by comparing the results of the two checksums, any computational error can be detected.
However, not all checksum schemes are suitable for ABFT FFT. It has been proved in [35] that the following checksum scheme works well for ABFT FFT:
where
2 i is the rst cube root of 1. As for error correction, time redundancy methods are preferred in almost all the approaches. Re-calculation is necessary to produce the correct result.
All of these ABFT schemes mentioned above are proposed for hardware implementation. ey assume that the size of input is xed for a speci c FFT implementation. In the hardware implementation, they detect errors by comparing the di erence of rX and rAx, and they assume input checksum vector rA can be pre-calculated when output checksum vector r is given. However, so ware FFT implementations usually accept varying sizes of input, and thus extra overhead will be introduced to calculate rA. e so ware-level implementation of this approach is shown in Algorithm 1.
ONLINE ABFT FFT SCHEMES
To correct errors in a more timely manner, two online schemes are proposed in this section. As faults are categorized into two for i from 0 to k − 1 do
5:
Set the calculation ag calcFla = true 6: while calcFla do 7: Calculate the i-th FFT:
end while 10: end for 11: Calculate input checksum vector c k = r k A k with DMR 12: for i from 0 to m − 1 do
13:
Multiply twiddle factor: X i = twiddle i . * X i with DMR 14: Set the calculation ag calcFla = true 15: while calcFla do 16: Calculate the i-th FFT:
end while 19: end for 20: end procedure types in this work, Section 3.1 introduces an online scheme aiming at computational faults while Section 3.2 proposes an online scheme that can deal with both computational faults and memory faults. e computational fault tolerant scheme in Section 3.1 is also complementary to ECC memory. It can detect and correct computational errors that ECC may not be able to handle.
Computational Fault Tolerance
Inspired by the divide-and-conquer nature of FFT algorithm, we leverage this algorithmic characteristic and o ine ABFT FFT scheme to propose an online ABFT scheme for FFT. Taking the tradeo of fault tolerant ability and overhead into consideration, we propose a two-layer ABFT approach that leverages the highest level of decomposition of a Cooley-Tukey FFT to protect the rst part and second part by two separate ABFT schemes.
From the view of the highest level of decomposition, an N -point FFT is calculated by computing k m-point FFTs, twiddle multiplications and m k-point FFTs when N = m * k. e k m-point FFTs can be protected separately by the ABFT approach. So can the m k-point FFTs. Also, twiddle multiplication can be protected by DMR with low overhead because it is memory-intensive.
us, the structure of online ABFT scheme can be shown in Fig. 1 . e colored parts are protected by their own FFTs while the red parts, including the twiddle multiplication and input checksum vector generation, are protected by DMR.
According to Fig. 1 , the input checksum c m = r m A m should be calculated at rst. en the m-point FFTs are executed and veri ed one by one. If there is error in the i-th FFT, it can be detected by comparing the checksum c m x i and r m X i . It will be corrected by an immediate re-execution of this FFT. Also, the output of the re-calculation would be veri ed. A er that, each element in the intermediate output will multiply itself with the corresponding twiddle factor (ω n 1 j 2 N ) to generate the input for the la er k-point FFTs.
en the k-point FFTs are executed and veri ed one by one.
ey can be protected by the same mechanism with input checksum c k = r k A k . If an error occurs during the execution of any k-point FFT, it can be detected and corrected as the rst part. However, if an error strikes the twiddle multiplication, the ABFT scheme cannot detect the error since the input has already been corrupted. erefore, online DMR is equipped for the twiddle multiplication. Each multiplication is executed twice and veri ed immediately to ensure correctness. If an error is detected here, a third execution is performed and the nal result would be the majority of the three executions. Since computation would only happen in one of the three parts or in the checksum calculation, any single computational error can be revealed. Besides these parts, the other parts are protected by one and only one ABFT FFT so that no computation is wasted. is ensures no masked error and no repeated protection on the same data.
e algorithm of this approach is shown in Algorithm 2. Compared with the o ine scheme, the two-layer online scheme only needs to compute two input checksum vectors of size m and k while the o ine one needs to compute one input checksum vector of size N . As this computation is one of major overhead, the online scheme should have be er performance. Furthermore, since each small FFT is equipped with separate protection, the online scheme is expected to achieve timely recovery when an error occurs.
Memory Fault Tolerance
Besides the logic units, faults may also strike memory to cause memory errors. is may be even more common than computational errors. If memory fault strikes some intermediate result during computation in some decomposed FFT, this error would behave like a computational error and can be detected and recovered by the ABFT schemes above. However, if it strikes the input before the calculation or the output a er the calculation, the error cannot be detected by this scheme alone. us, more strict mechanisms are needed to tolerate memory faults.
As usual, two checksums r 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and r 2 = (1, 2, . . . ,n) are used to detect and recover from a memory error. If any error occurs and changes the input x j into x j , the di erence will be:
en the error can be located by (r 2 x − r 2 x )/(r 1 x − r 1 x ) and recovered by adding r 1 x − r 1 x to the corrupted element.
In our fault model for the memory faults, we assume that memory faults would not occur when the checksums are being generated, otherwise, the error cannot be detected by ABFT approaches. is is reasonable because the checksum generation would only take very li le time (the time complexity is O (N ) and its coe cient is very small). Our basic idea to detect memory error is to verify data before use. Denote CCG as computational checksum generation, MCG as memory checksum generation, CCV as computational checksum veri cation, MCV as memory checksum veri cation, TM as twiddle multiplication, s as the number of FFTs to be computed together, then the hierarchy of memory protection is shown in Fig. 2 . Bold italic operations are original operations in FFTW. To ensure the correctness of the input, memory checksums of each m-point FFT . . are invoked at the beginning of these calculations. If an error occurs, the corrupted input will be located and recovered by the 2 checksums and a restart will be performed immediately. Otherwise, the computation is thought as fault-free and memory checksums for the intermediate output are generated. ese checksums will be used for veri cation before the twiddle multiplication to make sure there is no memory error in the output between the end of this m-point FFT and the end of all the k m-point FFTs.
A similar technique can be applied to the second part. Each k-point FFT needs memory checksum veri cation before computation, computational checksum veri cation, and output memory checksum generation a er computation. At last, the nal output is veri ed to ensure correctness of the result.
Besides the protection of the input, output and intermediate result, the input checksum vector rA for the m-point FFT and kpoint FFT should also be checked. ese veri cations can be done in time intervals related to the error rate, which is quite feasible across the whole computation. As there is only O ( √ n) time consumed in each veri cation, it would introduce very li le overhead. is mechanism helps a lot in correcting the memory errors. All the memory errors can be detected and recovered as long as two memory errors do not strike the same FFT at the same time.
SEQUENTIAL OPTIMIZATIONS
e implementation of F FTW is tricky. It is not easy to add fault tolerance while keeping the same performance. is section introduces some optimizations that we apply to minimize overhead.
Memory Checksum Modi cation
ough the traditional memory checksums r 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and r 2 = (1, 2, . . . ,n) work well for correcting memory error, they may involve redundant computation because they do not make use of the computational checksum r = (ω 0 3 ,ω 1 3 , . . . ,ω N −1
3
). Since rAx will be calculated under any circumstance to detect computational error, r 1 can be replaced by r 1 = r directly to save the computation time of r 1 x. Correspondingly the j-th element in the second checksum r 2 can be replaced by (r 2 ) j = j * (rA) j . Similar to the original checksum r 1 and r 2 , the di erence the new checksums would be:
en the error can be located by (r 2 x − r 2 x )/(r 1 x − r 1 x ). A er that correction can be done by adding (r 1 x − r 1 x )/(rA) j to the corrupted element. As the generation time for r 1 and r 2 is O (
the extra overhead on input checksum vector generation would be negligible. On the other hand, it saves the checksum generation time since it only costs 10N operations (8N for r 1 x, 2N for r 2 x) while the original one costs 14N (8N for rx, 2N for r 1 x, 4N for r 2 x).
Veri cation & Correction Postponing
According to Fig. 2 , there is input memory checksum generation when FFT starts, followed immediately by memory checksum verication and m-point FFTs. Inspired by the fact that the errors, both computational errors and memory errors, would propagate to the end of each decomposed FFT, MCVs before each m-point FFT can be postponed to the CCVs a er this m-point FFT. Since CCV can detect the error, the postponed MCV is eliminated.
Similarly, the MCVs a er k-point FFTs can be postponed to the nal MCV and these MCVs as well as the MCGs a er k-point FFTs can be eliminated for lower overhead. Unfortunately, this cannot be done directly since the second part is always done in-place where the input will be overwri en by the output. If the output veri cation is postponed, the error can still be detected since the checksums will not match. However, it cannot be corrected since the input is overwri en. us, another copy of the intermediate output is Besides, the correction operations r 2 x can be postponed to the time when an error is detected. However, it will result in slower recovery. When the error rate is low, the optimization can be adopted for lower overhead in error-free runs. When the error rate is high, the correction operations should not be postponed.
Incremental Checksum Generation
From Section 3.2, the MCG before twiddle multiplication is necessary because there is a rearrangement of data between the two ABFT parts. However, the veri cation mechanism still seems inecient since each element is veri ed twice. Instead of regeneration, this optimization uses incremental generation for the checksums to reorganize the memory checksums.
A er the input checksums are generated at the very beginning, extra space is allocated to store the information of the output. Unlike the previous approach, these output checksums directly store the checksums for the k-point FFTs in the second part. At rst, these checksums are initialized to 0. At the end of each m-point FFT, the k outputs increase their corresponding slots by their own value, i. e. the rst element X 0 would increase the rst slot in the checksum by X 0 while the second element X 1 would increase the second slot by X 1 . By this means, the j-th slot in the checksum would happen to be the checksum for elements in the j-th k-point FFT. us only one veri cation is needed before the second part.
Non-contiguous Memory Access
When a big FFT is broken down into smaller ones, the inputs of each smaller FFT would be non-contiguous as the rst k m-point FFTs in Fig. 2 . e stride (distance between adjacent inputs) of each m-point FFT would be 2k. It is usually O ( √ N ) and will result in low spatial locality in the cache. Besides basic use in FFT to compute the result, the inputs are also needed in CCGs and MCVs. Another read would be relatively expensive since there would be cache misses all the time, which leads to large overhead. is happens to MCG in the rst part. To resolve this, the corresponding MCGs are brought forward to the beginning of all the m-point FFTs and the new MCGs are computed via the incremental checksum generation approach above. It actually accesses each element twice. But each access has li le low overhead due to cache reuse.
Denote CMCG as the modi ed checksum generation and CMCV as the modi ed checksum veri cation in Section 4.1, the hierarchy of memory protection can be simpli ed to Fig. 3 with all the optimizations above. Compared to the original hierarchy in Fig. 2 , the optimized one is much simpler and faster.
ONLINE ABFT FFT ON PARALLEL SYSTEMS
FFT of large sizes becomes very common nowadays [11] . erefore, FFT may need to be performed in parallel to avoid the limited memory and low computational e ciency on single processor when FFT size becomes large. Although the idea of sequential ABFT FFT can be borrowed, challenge comes that parallel FFTs are always done in-place for be er utilization of memory. In-place and outof-place are property of an algorithm. In-place means that the algorithm will be done without auxiliary data structure. To make it simple for FFT, the in-place algorithm will store the output in the original input memory and does not bother to allocate a new memory space of size N . e out-of-place algorithm will allocate the memory space to store output in the beginning of the algorithm.
To compute parallel FFT, F FTW tends to choose a plan which computes N p p-point FFTs at rst and then p N p -point FFTs. Unfortunately, the data needed for each FFT is not always on the same processor. us communication among processors is needed during the computation. Assume FFT size is N and the number of processors is p. Data on each processor is divided into p blocks of size N p 2 . en a six-step algorithm that involves 3 transpositions is adopted for 1D parallel FFTs. A transposition is a communication that exchanges the i-th block of data in processor i with the j-th block of data in processor j for all i and j from 0 to p − 1. Denote the N p 2 p-point FFTs on a processor as F FT 1 and the la er N p -point FFT as F FT 2 . e rst transposition is performed at rst to deliver data needed for F FT 1 to the same processor. en F FT 1 is done on each processor in parallel. A er that, the second transposition occurs to exchange data for F FT 2 . F FT 2 is performed as the next step. When F FT 2 is done, the third transposition is executed to deliver data to its belonging processor. At last, there is some local adjustment to place the nal output in a correct order.
Because original input will be overwri en by output, the restart would not work for in-place FFTs. Fig. 4 shows the owchart of adding fault tolerance to in-place FFTs. Compared to the out-ofplace protection in the sequential scheme, input in each in-place FFT should have a backup in case an error occurs. Also, checksum veri cations should be done immediately a er the output is generated. When a memory error is detected, it should be corrected right away. A er that, the input will be recovered by the backup and a restart will be performed.
F FT 1 can be protected by the mechanism above because each p-point FFT only asks for 2p space. However, F FT 2 cannot be protected in this way because space will be doubled. Fortunately, the idea of the online sequential ABFT scheme can be applied here for timely detection, faster recovery and less space overhead because F FT 2 will be decomposed to smaller FFTs. Nevertheless, the sequential ABFT scheme cannot be leveraged directly because in-place FFTs tend to select a di erent execution plan from out-ofplace FFTs for e ciency. For example, if N p is a square number, F FTW may choose a plan similar to the out-of-place one to employ a two-layer decomposition; if it is not, i. e. N p = r * k 2 , F FTW would prefer a more complicated plan. It may perform r * k k-point FFTs at rst, then do twiddle multiplications and k 2 r -point FFTs, nally another twiddle multiplications and r * k k-point FFTs. In this situation, the original two-layer online ABFT can no longer Figure 5 : Sequential ABFT scheme no longer works: if an error occurs in the red part, it will be detected in the blue part. At this time, the procedure has to fail since original input is overwritten. Twiddle multiplication is omitted.
work as shown in Fig. 5 . Because the FFT is done in-place, the initial input is overwri en a er the k * r k-point FFTs so any restart a er the r * k k-point FFTs cannot be performed. A checkpoint for input would de nitely work here. However, it will have 100% space overhead and longer correction time. e solution to this kind of plan is to add one exible veri cation layer between the original two layers. e added layer would be protected by DMR since r is usually small (2 or 8 for N p is a power of 2), making the k m-point FFTs an ABFT-DMR scheme. As the execution time of the DMR part is very small (the same magnitude of the time for checksum generation and veri cation), we can assume there is no memory error in this part. en the input veri cation can be brought forward to all the DMR computations and the output checksum generation can be postponed to end of this part.
Besides the modi cations on fault-tolerant mechanisms, there are some modi cations on communication as well. In order to detect and correct errors that occur in communication, checksums for communicated data should be generated and sent. As there are only 2 checksums for each block of communicated data, the communication overhead would be negligible.
is scheme can be optimized by some of the optimizations mentioned in previous part. A er these optimizations, it is good from the sequential point of view because there are no redundant checksum generations and veri cations.
PARALLEL OPTIMIZATIONS
Besides sequential optimizations that mentioned in previous part, we also adopt several optimizations speci cally for parallel FFTs. Some of the optimizations can also be used in fault-free FFTs for be er performance. ese optimizations are incorporated into our implementation to reduce overhead.
Computation-Communication Overlap
In FFTW, blocking communication is used for transpositions. It is good because the following step usually needs data from all processors so the non-blocking method would have li le bene t. However, the checksum generation and veri cation in the ABFT FFT scheme Our idea for communication-computation overlap is very similar to the idea of pipeline. It doubles the number of send bu er and receive bu er. When Isend () is used to send data in send bu er sb 1 and Irec () is used to receive data in receive bu er rb 1 , data received in another receive bu er rb 2 can be processed and data to be sent in another send bu er sb 2 can be generated. When these operations are done, Iwait () can be used to wait for communication. A er that, data in rb 1 can be processed and data to be sent to next processor can be generated in sb 1 while sending data in sb 2 and receiving data in rb 2 . e algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.
With this technique, MCV and CCG before the p-point FFTs can be overlapped with transpose 1 . MCV, TM and CMCG before the k-point FFTs can be overlapped with transpose 2 . Besides, the send bu er initialization and receive bu er data transfer in each communication can also be overlapped. e online ABFT scheme for parallel in-place FFT a er overlap is shown in Fig. 6 . Bold italic operations are original operations in FFTW. is overlap is optimal since all the other operations are either in the critical path or dependent on the communication. Also, this optimization can be applied to F FTW to overlap the twiddle multiplication in F FT 2.1 with communication.
Re-design Plan in F FT 1
Since the input and output are both non-contiguous with a large stride in F FT 1 , there is high latency in accessing these elements due to cache misses. Fault-free FFTs do not su er much from this because the input and output are read and wri en once during the whole computation. However, with the fault tolerant operations, the input and output are at least accessed twice, which may lead to high overhead. Inspired by the implementation of sequential FFT, we use a similar idea to adjust the execution plan of F FT 1 .
In order to mitigate the overhead in multiple accesses, one bu er is allocated to store the input contiguously. e input is read into the bu er and computed in the bu er. e result is then veri ed in the bu er and copied to the output location when the computation is correct. To maximum reuse for data in the cache, the bu er can be made c times the size of data in the p-point FFT, where c is the number of data in the cache line. Each time one element is read into the bu er, the la er c elements are also read and stored in the bu er as well. In this way, cache can be be er utilized.
is change may have more operations because there are data assignments between input, output and the bu er. However, it may perform quite well when the p-point FFT barely ts in the cache. In this case, the original implementation would su er a lot since there is no reuse of cached data. On the other hand, this optimization can make use of cache because data are moved into the bu er. It would be more scalable compared to the original plan.
OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
is section analyzes the theoretical overhead for the various schemes above. In the following subsections, c 1 ,c 2 ,r 1 ,r 2 will be used to denote one operation of complex number multiplication, complex number addition, real number multiplication, real number addition. Assume one real number addition or one real number multiplication is the unit of operation, c 1 = 6, c 2 = 2 and 8r 1 + 3r 2 = 11 for the complex number division can be derived. is part only discusses the number of operations needed to add fault tolerance. e true overhead may di er since it heavily depends on the implementation. As a comparison, the total number of computational operations in the original FFT would roughly be 5N log 2 N .
Overhead in the Sequential Scheme
7.1.1 Computational FT in the O line Scheme. e overhead in the o ine scheme comes from input checksum vector generation, CCG and CCV. In the o ine scheme, rA can be calculated according to characteristics of arithmetic arrays to reduce overhead:
en it can be optimized by replacing trigonometric functions with 2 complex number multiplications. en the overhead would be:
CCG involves 1 complex number multiplication and 1 complex number addition for each element. Its overhead would be:
As for CCV, the total number of complex multiplications can be reduced to 2 by merging elements of same factors. So the overhead turns out to be:
erefore, the total overhead for the o ine scheme would be 37N . If an error occurs, the correction would be another run of the whole FFT and nal veri cation. So the correction time would be 39N + 5N log 2 N . 7.1.2 Computational FT in the Online ABFT Scheme. e overhead for the online scheme comes from checksum operations in the two ABFT parts and DMR for input checksum vector generation and twiddle multiplication. DMR for input checksum vector generation is negligible since the checksum sizes are O ( √ N ). DMR for twiddle multiplication would cost 12N because it needs 2 complex number multiplications. Overhead for ABFT comes from CCG and CCV. ey cost 8N and 2N respectively. e two ABFT parts have the same overhead.
us the total overhead for the two-layer ABFT scheme would be:
If an error occurs in DMR, it will be detected and corrected in no time. If an error strikes the ABFT parts, it will be detected by the ABFT scheme and an FFT of size k or m will be performed. As k and m are usually θ ( √ N ), the recalculation will always be an FFT of size θ ( √ N ), which is negligible. erefore, the overhead for the online scheme would still be 32N even if an error occurs.
Total Overhead in the O line
Scheme. e extra operations in the o ine scheme would be the computation of r 2 x when the corresponding optimizations are applied.
is computation will cost 4N operations. erefore, the total overhead for the o ine scheme would be:
If there is error, whole computation a er checksums generation will be restarted, including the veri cation operations. e overhead would be 5N log 2 N + 43N .
Total
Overhead in the Online Scheme. In CMCG, there are 4N extra operations for the new checksum r 2 calculation. Besides, there is one more MCG and MCV, which corresponds to 6N operations. Also, there is one more CMCV of 2N operations in the end. en the total overhead will be:
As the recovery time for both computational error and memory error is negligible, the overhead would still be 46N when an error occurs during the execution.
Sequential Space Overhead
When FFT is calculated on single processor, the space overhead only comes from the checksums of each small FFTs and protection for the bu ered intermediate output. As these sizes are at most 4k or 4m, the whole scheme only requires O ( √ N ) extra space. e overhead for this situation would be:
Overhead in the Parallel Scheme
When r 1, there is 1 more MCV and 1 more MCV as well as DMR for TM and r -point FFTs, thus the overhead in this situation is: T ABFT p2 = 96n + 6n + 2n + 12n + 5n log 2 r = 116n + 5n log 2 r 7.3.2 Overhead A er Communication-Computation Overlap. e overlapped communication includes 2 MCVs, 2 CMCGs and 1 TM, thus the new overhead when r = 1 would be:
Similarly, the new overhead when r 1 would be: T ABFT p2 = 116n + 5n log 2 r − (2 * (12n + 2n) + 12n) = 76n + 5n log 2 r e correction time for the parallel online scheme would also be negligible since correction in each part would cost negligible time.
Parallel Space Overhead
Assume the size of used space is n = N p on each processor, the largest allocated extra memory would be the checksum arrays in F FT 1 , which totally take up 2n p space. Besides, there are bu ers for communication. Our communication-computation overlap operations allocate four bu ers, each of which takes up n p space. us total space overhead would be 6n
p . e other extra memory are all O (m) or O (k ), which is θ ( √ n). Also, the operations in communication can reuse the space freed from the send and receive bu ers in the communication, which requires no extra memory.
erefore, the required extra space would be 6n p , then the relative space overhead would be 6 p . 
Parallel Communication Overhead

IMPACT OF ROUND-OFF ERRORS
Due to the nite word length in oating number arithmetic, roundo errors are unavoidable in so ware level implementations. erefore, the two checksums in the ABFT scheme may not be equal even though the whole FFT system is fault free. To avoid the situation above to be diagnosed as faulty, a small di erence η between the result is allowed as in previous work. e selection of η is essential because it is a tradeo between throughput (true negative, fault-free while diagnosed as faulty) and fault coverage (false positive, faulty while diagnosed as fault-free). is section analyzes the estimation of round-o errors and how to choose suitable η.
Round-o Errors in Computational FT
In existing work, the hardware implementations always employ the xed-point round o strategy, which is quite di erent from the oating point arithmetic in the so ware level. Fortunately, Liu [23] , Weinstein [36] and Gentleman [19] have already conducted some research on this topic. Assuming the N real numbers and N imaginary numbers in the input are mutually uncorrelated random variables with zero means. According to [36] , the noise-to-signal ratio in an N -point FFT computation would be:
E is the variance of round-o error, σ 2 X is the variance of the input, σ ϵ is the error due to rounding oating point multiplication or addition. σ ϵ can be assumed uniformly distributed in (−2 −t , 2 −t ) or experimentally measured as σ ϵ 2 = (0.21)2 −2t in [19] , where t is the number of bits in the mantissa part of a oating point.
Assume the input x of an m-point FFT has zero means and variance σ 0 . Its output X will have zero means and variance σ 1 = √ mσ 0 .
According to equation (3), the variance of round-o would be σ e = 2σ 2 0 σ 2 ϵ log 2 m. A er the summation, the variance of the round o error in the nal sum would vary from log 2 m * ar (X )σ e to m * ar (X )σ e . In the very rst FFT, where the precision loss is important, it is approximated to the upper-bound m * ar (X )σ e .
As the input precision loss would be much smaller than the output precision loss, the variance of the nal di erence would be σ r oe = m * ar (X )σ e = m mσ 2 0 * 2σ 2 ϵ log 2 m. In the k-point FFTs, the input has variance √ mσ 0 and output has variance √ kmσ 0 .
As current precision is much lower than the machine precision, log 2 k * ar (X )σ e is taken as the variance of round o error a er the summation. us σ r oe2 = log 2 k kmσ 2 0 * 2kσ 2 0 σ 2 ϵ log 2 k. A er that, an approach similar to [35] can be employed to set the coe cient η. According to central limit theory, the throughput of an N-point FFT can be estimated as:
√ N σ , the theoretical throughput is 0.997. According to this formula, di erent η can be set to di erent parts of the online ABFT scheme. I.e., η 1 = 3 √ mσ r oe , η 2 = 3 √ kσ r oe2 can be chosen respectively for m-point FFTs and k-point FFTs in sequential FFT. In parallel FFT, things are similar. e only di erence is that there are three ηs to be set respectively for F FT 1 , F FT 2.1 and F FT 2.2 .
Round-o Errors in Memory FT
Memory round-o errors would be much smaller since it only involves simple summation. According to the analysis above, the summation of m elements in the array x will result in a variance m * ar (x )σ ϵ in the precision loss in the result for data with high precision. en threshold can be set by the approach above.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
We implement the proposed ABFT scheme into the widely used FFTW library [15, 16] -one of the fastest so ware implementations of FFT and reports the experimental results in this section.
Experiment Setup
We evaluated our implementation on TIANHE-2, the current 2nd fastest supercomputer in the world. Each node of TIANHE-2 has 2 E5-2692 processors (with 24 cores in all) and 64GB memory.
Overhead in Sequential Scheme
is section evaluates the sequential schemes for out-of-place FFT on single processor. FFT sizes from 2 25 to 2 28 are tested. Each experiment is run 9 times and the average number is recorded.
Experiments without Fault.
Four schemes are evaluated at this part and the results are shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 7(a) shows the evaluations for computational FT schemes. e rst bar shows the overhead of the naive o ine scheme. e second bar is the evaluation of the optimized o ine scheme. A naive online scheme is displayed as the third bar and an optimized online scheme is shown as the last bar. Fig. 7(b) shows the evaluations for computational and memory FT schemes. e only di erence is that the third bar displays the online scheme with computational FT optimizations.
From the gure, we can see that the optimization techniques play an important role in the FT-FFT schemes. e optimized o ine scheme is much be er than the naive o ine scheme due to the number of calls to the trigonometric functions. e optimized online scheme outperforms the o ine one a lot when only computational errors are considered. Also, it has comparable performance to the optimized o ine scheme even when memory errors are considered.
Experiments with
Faults. is part shows the timely recovery of the online scheme. As the o ine scheme only guarantees to detect one error, only one memory fault is injected in the optimized o ine scheme. ree fault injections are performed on the online scheme: one computational fault (1c); one computational fault and a memory fault (1m + 1c); two computational faults and one memory fault (1m + 2c). (0) indicates fault-free executions as comparison. Computational fault is simulated as adding some constant to an element while memory fault is simulated by changing one element to another constant. Table 1 shows the execution time of the optimized schemes with di erent number of errors. According to the table, the online scheme does have strong fault tolerant ability. e o ine scheme su ers from the re-execution when an error occurs thus it costs about twice the time the online scheme does. On the other hand, because one error only leads to a recalculation of a m-point FFT or s k-point FFTs which costs O ( √ N log √ N ) time, the execution time of the online scheme can almost maintain the same when the number of errors increases. In fact, as long as no two errors strike the same m-point FFT or s k-point FFTs at the same time, the online scheme is able to detect and correct all of them quickly. erefore, the online scheme is able to perform well even when the error rate is relatively high, showing great advantage over the o ne scheme.
Performance in Parallel Scheme
is section evaluates the parallel online scheme for in-place FFT in large scale. Because of uctuations, each experiment is run 20 times and the average number is recorded. Section 6. e last bar opt − FT − F FTW is the parallel fault tolerant scheme with both sequential and parallel optimizations. According to the gure, the sequentially optimized ABFT scheme has some overhead over the original F FTW . e overhead comes from the checksum operations. On the other hand, the online scheme with parallel optimizations beats the original F FTW in error-free runs because the parallel optimizations work very well. However, it still has some overhead over opt − F FTW due to checksum operations.
Experiments with
Faults. is part shows the fault tolerant ability of the parallel online scheme. Fault injection is similar to the one in Section 9.2.2 except that faults are injected in each processor. Experiments of no faults (0), 2 memory faults (2m), 2 computational faults (2c), 2 memory faults and 2 computational faults (2m+2c) are shown in Table 2 and Table 3 .
According to the tables, this scheme does have strong fault tolerant ability. It only takes very li le time to recover from multiple faults because each fault only revokes a restart of one or several p-point FFTs or n p -point FFTs. Note that sometimes the error free run may have longer execution time. is is caused by uctuation.
Round-o Errors
As parallel FFTs have similar round-o error impact to sequential scheme, only experiments on sequential schemes of 2 25 -point FFT are tested. ese results can be generalized to the parallel scheme.
9.4.1 Round-o Error Approximation. In this part, the accuracy of round-o analysis in Section 8 is evaluated. Input from uniform distribution U (−1, 1) and normal distribution N (0, 1) is tested respectively. 1000 runs are performed thus there are 8192000 m-point FFTs and 1024000 s k-point FFTs. e result is shown in Table 4 . In Table 4 , the column Max 1 shows the max round-o error in the m-point FFTs. Est 1 shows the estimated η for this part. Thput 1 shows the throughput of the scheme. e la er three columns show the same property of the k-point FFTs.
e selected η provides nearly 100% throughput while keeping close to the round-o error bound. It promises good coverage.
Detection Ability
Comparison. is section compares the detection ability of the online scheme and the o ine scheme. Same fault is injected into the same position of the di erent schemes.
ree fault injection positions are tested in this part. e 1 is injected in the input a er checksum veri cation; e 2 is injected in the input of the second FFT; e 3 is injected in the nal output. In the fault injection, the selected element will increase itself by the given error magnitude. I. e., if the magnitude of error is 10 −3 , 10 −3 is added to the selected element and whether the error is detected is observed. η of the o ine scheme is set as the round-o error bound of error-free runs to allow for 100% throughput.
From Table 5 , the online scheme can detect a much smaller magnitude of errors than the o ine scheme. us, when throughput is similar, the online scheme should have much larger fault coverage.
Fault
Coverage Tests. is section shows the relative errors of FFT output a er an error occurs in a 2 25 -point sequential FFT with input drawn from U (−1, 1). As random computational errors are hard to simulate and some of them can be simulated as memory errors, only memory error of single bit ip is tested here.
Some fault-free runs of 2 25 -point FFT are performed at rst to get a rough upper bound of the round-o errors of the o ine schemes. A er that, η is set as this rough upper-bound to allow for nearly 100% throughput and relative errors are evaluated a er randomly ipping one higher bit ( ipping lower bit is usually masked) in the input or output array. De ne the relative error as
, where x is the correct output, x is the output with fault injection and || • || ∞ is the in nity norm of vector. 1000 independent runs are performed and the distribution of relative errors is shown in Table  6 . e rst row shows the relative error of runs without correction. It indicates the impact of errors on output as a comparison. e second column U ncorrected shows the percentage of uncorrected errors due to wrong indexing caused by round-o errors. It can be improved by changing the indexing checksum r 2 . For these situations, the relative error is set as in nite.
According to the table, the online scheme outperforms the ofine scheme a lot in fault coverage because the relative errors it introduces are of much smaller magnitude. For example, if the error bound is set as 10 −12 , the fault coverage in the online scheme would be 96.1% compared to 64.3% in the o ine scheme. It shows great potential in practical use.
CONCLUSION
is paper presents an online ABFT scheme to correct so errors online in the widely used FFT computations. e proposed scheme only needs to repeat a small fraction of the computation a er errors occur. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed scheme improves the computing e ciency by 2X over existing schemes when errors occur.
